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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jose Luis Sanchez appeals from his convictions for two counts of sexual
abuse of a child and five counts of lewd conduct with a child.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2006, J.C.’s mother dropped then eight-year-old J.C. off to be babysat
by Alejandra, Sanchez’s wife. (Trial Tr., p. 151, L. 12 – p. 152, L. 20; p. 156,
Ls. 1-2.) J.C.’s mother and Alexandra are cousins. (Trial Tr., p. 156, Ls. 1-2.)
Later that day, Sanchez led J.C. into the basement to a storage room, where he
grabbed her chest from behind and rubbed his erect penis on her buttocks. (Trial
Tr., p. 158, L. 3 – p. 159, L. 19.) He threatened to sexually molest J.C.’s sisters
and murder her parents if she did not keep the abuse secret. (Trial Tr., p. 159,
L. 25 – p. 160, L. 13.) He later that day took J.C. to his bedroom, pulled off her
skirt and underwear, and rubbed his erect and exposed penis on her vagina and
stomach. (Trial Tr., p. 161, L. 21 – p. 164, L. 21.)
The next day Sanchez brought J.C. into a bathroom and showed her a
pornographic movie of adults having sex and told her she needed to watch to
learn “how to be a real woman.” (Trial Tr., p. 166, L. 7 – p. 168, L. 20.) That
night he came into the room where J.C. was in bed, laid down next to her, put his
hand in her pajamas and rubbed her genitals with his hand while he rubbed his
penis on her leg. (Trial Tr., p. 170, L. 16 – p. 172, L. 23.) Before she left the next
morning, Sanchez again threatened J.C.’s sisters and parents if she disclosed
the abuse. (Trial Tr., p. 174, Ls. 6-22.)
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On the third day, late at night, Sanchez found J.C. where she was hiding
in the bathroom and led her downstairs. (Trial Tr., p. 174, L. 23 – p. 177, L. 1.)
This time he touched her chest and rubbed her vagina under her clothing, and
performed a “hard hump” that made him “moan.” (Trial Tr., p. 177, L. 2-24.)
When J.C. began “crying loud and telling him to please stop” he covered her
mouth with his hand and again threatened her family. (Trial Tr., p. 178, Ls. 4-23.)
Also in 2006, T.C.’s mother dropped then eight-year-old T.C. off to stay a
few days with her aunt and uncle, Alejandra and Sanchez. (Trial Tr., p. 192,
Ls. 6-18; p. 196, Ls. 19-25.) That night T.C. saw a light on in the kitchen, and
found Sanchez painting. (Trial Tr., p. 193, Ls. 9-20.) When she asked to paint,
Sanchez put her on his lap and, while she painted, put his hand in her shorts and
rubbed her vagina. (Trial Tr., p. 193, L. 20 – p. 195, L. 2.) He told her that the
abuse was a secret and she was not to tell anyone. (Trial Tr., p. 195, Ls. 5-7.) A
couple of nights later Sanchez sat down by T.C. where she was sleeping in the
living room, grabbed her hand, and used her hand to rub his “scrotum area.”
(Trial Tr., p. 197, L. 5 – p. 198, L. 22.)
The state charged Sanchez by information with two counts of sexual
abuse of a child and three counts of lewd conduct with a child for his sexual
contact with J.C. (R., pp. 36-38.) After seeing the preliminary hearing in that
case, T.C. disclosed the abuse she suffered at the hands of Sanchez. (11/3/14
Tr., p. 15, Ls. 9-16.) The state charged Sanchez in a separate information with
two counts of lewd conduct with a child and one count of sexual abuse of a child
for his sexual contact with T.C. (R., pp. 324-25.) The state moved to join the
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cases (R., pp. 58, 101-04), Sanchez objected to the joinder (R, pp. 95-98), and
the district court granted the joinder (R., pp. 174, 401).
The matter proceeded to jury trial (see generally Trial Tr.), following which
the jury convicted Sanchez of two counts of sexual abuse of a child and five
counts of lewd conduct with a child (R., pp. 218-19, 441-42). The district court
imposed concurrent sentences of life with five years determinate for the lewd
conduct convictions and 20 years with ten years determinate for the sexual
abuse convictions and entered judgment. (R., pp. 264-66, 477-79.) Sanchez
filed timely notices of appeal from the judgments. (R., pp. 279-80, 490-91.)
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ISSUES
Sanchez states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it granted the State’s motion to
consolidate because the charges were not properly joined?

2.

Did the state commit misconduct when its witness
commented on Mr. Sanchez’s invocation of his right to
counsel?

3.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was
Mr. Sanchez’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
of law violated because the accumulation of errors deprived
him of his right to a fair trial?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Sanchez failed to show that the district court erred when it allowed
the joinder of cases where the crimes happened at about the same time and
involved very similar circumstances?
2.
Has Sanchez failed to show that his trial counsel’s act of eliciting evidence
that Sanchez invoked his right to counsel constitutes fundamental error?
3.
Has Sanchez failed to show cumulative error because the cumulative error
doctrine is not even theoretically applicable to this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Sanchez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Allowed The
Joinder Of Cases Where The Crimes Happened At About The Same Time And
Involved Very Similar Circumstances
A.

Introduction
The district court ordered joinder of the two informations, each alleging

sex crimes against a different victim in the same time-frame under nearly
identical circumstances. (R., pp. 174, 401.) Sanchez argues that the district
court erred, claiming the evidence at trial shows that the circumstances were not
so similar as to allow the finding that the crimes were connected or based on a
common scheme or plan.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-18.)

Because the trial

evidence was not before the district court when it made its ruling, and is therefore
not properly considered in reviewing the district court’s ruling, Sanchez’s
argument fails.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a

question of law, over which this Court exercises free review.” State v. Field,
144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.3d 273, 278 (2007) (citations omitted).
C.

Sanchez’s Argument Fails Because Its Reliance On The Trial Evidence Is
Contrary To The Applicable Legal Standard
Multiple offenses may be charged in the same information if they are

“based on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.”
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I.C.R. 8(a). To show a common scheme or plan there must be evidence “beyond
the bare fact that sexual misconduct has occurred with children in the past.”
State v. Orellano-Castro, 158 Idaho 757, 762, 351 P.3d 1215, 1220 (2015)
(internal citation omitted).

Rather, the “events must be linked by common

characteristics that go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead
must objectively tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Cases discussing common plans have focused
on whether the offenses were one continuing action or whether the offenses
have sufficient common elements including the type of sexual abuse, the
circumstances under which the abuse occurred, and the age of the victims.”
Field, 144 Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279.
“Whether joinder is proper is determined by what is alleged, not what the
proof eventually shows.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). However, because a
charging document may not contain all of the facts necessary to make the
decision to join “the trial court will have to consider information other than
contained in the charging document(s) to determine whether joinder complies
with Rule 8.” Orellano-Castro, 158 Idaho at 760, 351 P.3d at 1218.
The facts presented to the district court are as follows: In the first case the
state alleged Sanchez committed three lewd acts and two acts of sexual abuse
with an eight-year-old child on or between April 1 and June 30, 2006, by rubbing
her breasts with his hands, rubbing her vagina with his penis, showing her
pornography, and twice rubbing her vagina with his hands. (R., pp. 36-38.) In
the second case the state alleged Sanchez committed two acts of lewd conduct
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on or between April 17 and June 12, 2006, and one act of sexual abuse on or
about June 13 and August 31, 2006, with a different eight-year-old, by
respectively touching her vagina with his hands, having the child touch his penis
with her hands, and touching her vagina with his hands. (R., pp. 324-25.) As
pointed out by the state in support of the motion to join, both of the victims were
eight years old and all of the incidents “occurred during the spring and summer of
2006” while the victims were “being watched by Mr. Sanchez and his wife” in
Mr. Sanchez’s home. (R., p. 101.) The defense asserted that “the acts were
committed on separate victims on separate occasions” and there was no “nexus”
between the crimes.

(R., pp. 95-96.)

Finally, the prosecutor noted that the

second victim disclosed the abuse in response to learning of the disclosure by
the first victim because she attended the preliminary hearing in the first case.
(11/03/14 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 1-23.)
This standard was applied to similar facts in State v. Schwartzmiller,
107 Idaho 89, 685 P.2d 830 (1984).

A complete recitation of the facts as

provided by the Court is in order:
The acts with which defendant was charged took place in late 1978
with two fourteen year old boys, hereinafter A and B. The defendant
evidently frequented a parking lot at a junior high school and a
restaurant near the school. While A and his family were at an auto
racing meet, the defendant struck up an acquaintance with the
family and offered an opportunity to work on a race car. A was
invited to the defendant’s house, where they spent time having
beer, using marijuana, and later having dinner. Later that evening,
defendant took A to his bedroom and performed anal copulation
upon A. Approximately one month later, the same sequence of
events occurred involving A and the defendant.
B lived with his mother, who was separated from his father, and
met the defendant at a pizza parlor during November 1978.
7

Approximately one month later, both A and B, together with A’s
family, were at the defendant’s home for dinner. B remained with
the defendant after the others had left and was given five beers.
Late in the evening, the defendant took B to a bedroom where he
performed masturbation and fellatio upon B, and attempted anal
intercourse upon B.
Id. at 91, 685 P.2d at 832.

Based on these facts, and the applicable legal

standards, the Court held:
Although appellant argues that the counts against him were
improperly joined, Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a) states that two or more
offenses may be charged on the same complaint if the offenses are
based on “two or more acts or transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” Here the facts
demonstrate a common plan, in that Schwartzmiller frequents areas
where young boys may be found, befriends boys with no father
figure in the home, entices them from their homes, lowers their
natural inhibitions through the use of drugs and alcohol, and
commits sex acts upon them. We find no error in the joining of the
offenses.
Id. at 92-93, 685 P.2d at 833-34.
The facts in this case are also strikingly similar to those in State v.
Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 824-25, 992 P.2d 1219, 1224-25 (Ct. App. 1999). In
that case the Idaho Court of Appeals reasoned:
Longoria’s behavior patterns and conduct in each incident are
virtually identical. Had each count been tried separately, evidence
of Longoria's other two sex crimes would have been admissible in
each of the trials to prove a common plan to exploit and sexually
abuse an identifiable group of young female victims. Each occurred
during a sleepover with one of Longoria’s daughters. All the victims
were of similar age, between nine and eleven years old, at the time
Longoria molested them. In the first two cases, Longoria waited
until late and lured or carried his victims to another room where he
committed lewd acts upon them. Accordingly, we cannot say that
Longoria was prejudiced by the district court’s denial of his motion
to sever, or that the court abused its discretion in this regard.
Id. at 825, 992 P.2d at 1225 (footnote omitted).
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Here, as in Schwartzmiller and Longoria, analysis of “the type of sexual
abuse, the circumstances under which the abuse occurred, and the age of the
victims,” Field, 144 Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279, shows that the charges are
properly joined. The type of sexual abuse was very similar in that the state
alleged as to both victims that Sanchez rubbed their genitals with his hands and
also touched his genitals to parts of the victims’ bodies. (Compare R., pp. 37-38
with R., pp. 324-25.) The circumstances under which the abuse occurred are
also alike, in that Sanchez abused both victims in a time-frame between April and
June, 2006, in the same place, while the victims were in his wife’s care. (Id.)
Finally, both victims were eight years old.

(Id.)

As in Schwartzmiller and

Longoria, these commonalities are sufficient to permit joinder.
On appeal Sanchez argues that “there is no evidence to show a common
scheme or plan” and “the similarities between Mr. Sanchez’s alleged abuse of
J.C. and T.C. are essentially the same or less compelling than the general
similarities in [State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227 P.3d 918, 921 (2010)].”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 17.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, Sanchez’s
argument is based on the trial transcript (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15), which the
trial court clearly did not have for its pre-trial ruling on joinder. Because, as
stated above, the determination of joinder is based on the facts and allegations
placed before the district court and is not based on “what the proof eventually
shows,” Field, 144 Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279, this argument is irrelevant and
must be disregarded.
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Second, even if Sanchez’s argument were based on the evidence
presented to the district court both for and against the motion to join it fails. As
set forth above, the facts are consistent with a common scheme or plan. Both
girls were an identical age, both were in the care or custody of Sanchez and his
wife, all the incidents occurred in Sanchez’s home within the same time-frame
and Sanchez engaged in very similar acts of abuse. Indeed, if Sanchez had
robbed two nearly identical banks within weeks of each other using the same
general method there could be little doubt that a finding of a common scheme or
plan, and thus joinder, would be appropriate. Sex crimes are not held to a higher
standard.
Contrary to Sanchez’s argument, the facts here and in Johnson are easily
distinguishable. Johnson was charged with sexually molesting his six or sevenyear-old daughter in 2004 by manually touching her genitals, having her
manually and orally touch his genitals, and attempting to penetrate her vagina
with his penis.

Johnson, 148 Idaho at 666, 227 P.3d at 920.

The Court

addressed the admissibility under I.R.E. 404(b) of evidence that:
Johnson molested his eight-year-old sister, Elizabeth, when he was
between the ages of fifteen and sixteen. The abuse consisted of
Mr. Johnson exposing himself to his sister and requesting that she
expose herself to him. The State also showed that Mr. Johnson
once requested Elizabeth to touch his penis and that she complied.
Id. at 667, 227 P.3d at 921. The alleged sexual abuse of his sister occurred
several years earlier, when he was about 15 or 16 and she was about eight. Id.
at 666, 227 P.3d at 920. The only similarities, the Court noted, were that “the two
victims in this case are juvenile females and that Johnson is a family member.”
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Id. at 669, 227 P.3d at 923. Here the incidents of abuse were committed in the
span of months and may have even overlapped, as opposed to having occurred
years apart. Here the victims were the same age, not merely “juvenile females.”
Here the acts of molestation were very similar (both involving manual-genital and
other sexual touching) rather than the disparate acts of molestation and sexual
experimentation described in Johnson. Finally, in addition to both victims being
family members, both were in the temporary care of Sanchez and his wife in his
home overnight.

Sanchez has failed to show error in the joinder of the two

informations.
D.

Any Error Is Necessarily Harmless
A trial error can be declared harmless if the appellate court concludes on

de novo review it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). To show harmless error the state has “the
burden of showing that it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational
jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” Premo v. Moore,
562 U.S. 115, 130 (2011) (internal quotations omitted). Where the error placed
impermissible evidence, argument or information before the jury the Supreme
Court has required the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error did not contribute to the conviction. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 (admission of
confession that should have been suppressed); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 295-96 (1991) (argument for guilt from defendant’s silence); Deck v.
Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005) (visible shackles without cause at jury trial).
An “otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may
11

confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681

(1986). In conjunction with the review of the whole record, review of the strength
of the state’s evidence is appropriate. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16-20
(1999); see also Premo, 562 U.S. at 129-31. The analysis ultimately focuses “on
the underlying fairness of the trial.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 18-19.
Even if Sanchez had shown error in joining the informations the error was
harmless. First, the jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence and the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (R., p. 183), that they were to
follow the instructions as given (R., pp. 184-85), and that they were to “decide
each count separately on the evidence and law that applies to it, uninfluenced by
your decision as to any other count” (R., p. 201). “Idaho appellate courts also
presume that a jury follows the instructions it is given.” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1,
7, 304 P.3d 276, 282 (2013) (citation omitted).
Second, any error is harmless because the jury would have heard the
same evidence even if the trials were separated. The defense theory of the case
was that Sanchez could not have done what J.C. and T.C. testified to because of
an injury to his hand (Trial Tr., p. 229, L. 18 – p. 234, L. 4; p. 234, L. 23 – p. 236,
L. 6; p. 244, L. 17 – p. 245, L. 11) and because he was never alone with J.C. or
T.C. (Trial Tr., p. 234, Ls. 5-22; p. 242, L. 15 – p. 244, L. 8). Defense counsel
also contended that the presence of other people in the house and even the
same room made the victim’s accounts “highly improbable.” (Trial Tr., p. 270,
L. 2 – p. 271, L. 20.)

These defenses put squarely at issue questions of
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opportunity, intent, and mistake or accident, all of which are proper subjects for
admission of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b). See, e.g., State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho
217, 219-20, 970 P.2d 10, 12-13 (1998) (evidence of similar acts of sexual
touching admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) to show lack of accident); State v.
Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, 154-55, 254 P.3d 47, 55-56 (Ct. App. 2011)
(I.R.E. 404(b) evidence admissible where opportunity at issue because others
present in house and in bedroom of charged sexual abuse). Thus, even if the
testimony of the victims did not establish a plan, it was admissible in relation to
other counts as evidence rebutting the defenses of inability, lack of opportunity,
lack of intent, mistake or accident.
For these reasons, even if the joinder was improper, any error was
harmless.
II.
Sanchez Has Failed To Show That His Trial Counsel’s Act Of Eliciting Evidence
That Sanchez Invoked His Right To Counsel Constitutes Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
During cross-examination of the investigating detective, Sanchez’s trial

counsel elicited the following testimony:
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. MURDOCH
Q. Officer Nalley you spoke with Mr. Sanchez about the allegations
against him, didn’t you?
A. Yes I did.
Q. And when you spoke to him about those allegations, he denied
that they ever happened; isn’t that correct?
13

A. He never admitted to touching the girls. He did admit to
knowing the girls, admitted that they were in his home at the
address we’re talking about on Riverton Road.
Q. But he denied that he ever touched them inappropriately; isn’t
that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And did you—he denied that he ever showed her—showed
[J.C.] pornographic videos; is that right?
A. I would have to refer to my reports. I don’t believe we got
that far into the questioning before he invoked his right to
have an attorney present.
MR. MURDOCH Okay. I don’t have any further questions Your
Honor.
(Trial Tr., p. 149, L. 15 – p. 150, L. 12 (bolding original)). On appeal Sanchez
argues that his trial counsel’s act of eliciting this testimony was prosecutorial
misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-24.)
This argument does not withstand analysis.
B.

Standard Of Review
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct

depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant fails to
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor,
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental
error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).
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C.

Sanchez Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
Under the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho

209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), unobjected to claims of constitutional error are
reviewed using a three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). None of the three prongs are
present in this case.
First, there was no violation of Constitutional rights.

It violates due

process to use evidence of an invocation of Miranda warnings to imply guilt.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976). A defendant, however, can “open
the door” to use of such evidence for purposes other than implying guilt. State v.
Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1, 4, 121 P.3d 416, 419 (Ct. App. 2005), partially
abrogated by State v. Galvan, 156 Idaho 379, 383 n.5, 326 P.3d 1029, 1033 n.5
(Ct. App. 2014).

“‘It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest

silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies
to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same
version upon arrest.’” Id. (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 n.11).
In this case, Sanchez’s counsel specifically asked if Sanchez had
provided an exculpatory version of events regarding the charge of showing a

15

pornographic movie to J.C. (a denial) in the detective’s interview.

(Trial Tr.,

p. 150, Ls. 5-7.) The detective responded that Sanchez had not provided such a
denial, and why. (Trial Tr., p. 150, Ls. 8-10.) Any other answer (e.g., “he did not
deny that,” “I did not ask him about that,” etc.) would have been incomplete and
potentially misleading. Sanchez has not shown a violation of his due process
rights where his own counsel elicited evidence that Sanchez invoked his Miranda
rights.
Second, the alleged violation is not clear in the record.

Contrary to

Sanchez’s claim that the detective’s answer was an “unsolicited comment”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 20), it was in fact elicited by defense counsel. In opening
statement trial counsel said, “Law enforcement interviewed my client, talked to
him about the accusations, and he denied all of them.” (Trial Tr., p. 142, Ls. 1617 (emphasis added).) He further informed the jury that Sanchez intended to
take the stand and testify that the events described by the victims never
happened. (Trial Tr., p.143, Ls. 17-22.) Sanchez did testify, and told the jury
that he had denied sexually touching the victims in the police interview. (Trial Tr.,
p. 237, Ls. 12-21.) Counsel referenced this denial in closing argument. (Trial
Tr., p. 273, Ls. 6-25.) With this context in mind, it is clear that trial counsel was
trying to elicit an admission that Sanchez had denied showing J.C. pornography
as well as denying sexual contact. (Trial Tr., p. 149, L. 17 – p. 150, L. 7.) The
detective’s answer that Sanchez had not denied the allegation, because he had
invoked his rights prior to being asked about that incident, was directly
responsive to the question asked.
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Moreover, the lack of an objection to the answer to trial counsel’s question
might well have been tactical. Trial counsel did not claim the detective’s answer
was “unsolicited” or not responsive as appellate counsel now claims, nor did trial
counsel request a mistrial, that the answer be stricken, or that the court issue a
curative instruction. Trial counsel may have concluded a mistrial was not in his
client’s best interests, or that a curative instruction would merely highlight the
evidence.

Moreover, trial counsel had successfully elicited testimony that

Sanchez had participated in an interview and denied sexually touching the girls,
and may have concluded that the jury was unlikely to deem evidence of a
subsequent invocation of rights to be evidence of guilt. Finally, counsel could
have concluded, having introduced the question of whether Sanchez had made a
specific denial, and consistent with the legal authority cited above, that the state
would be allowed to present all relevant evidence explaining why such a denial
had not happened. Sanchez has failed to show that the error he complains of is
clear on the record and without the need of a more complete record, especially
regarding counsel’s election to not object.
Finally, there is no prejudice shown by this record. Sanchez argues the
jury “likely inferred that Mr. Sanchez’s silence arose from his guilt.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 22.) Other than this supposition, Sanchez offers no reason why the jury
would draw such an inference.

Unlike a case where there was a blanket

invocation, the jury heard that the interview proceeded at least as far as Sanchez
denying sexual contact with J.C. and T.C. (Trial Tr., p. 149, L. 17 – p. 150, L. 4.)
Moreover, Sanchez testified at trial. (Trial Tr., pp. 228-241.) That Sanchez had
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consistently denied sexual contact was a theme of the defense. (Trial Tr., p. 273,
Ls. 6-25.) Under these circumstances Sanchez has failed to show that the jury
drew an inference of guilt from the challenged evidence, much less that any such
inference affecting the outcome of the trial.
After pointing out that the prosecutor’s theme was about secrets, Sanchez
next argues: “The additional implication that, when interviewed, Mr. Sanchez
invoked his right to counsel supported the prosecutor’s theme that Mr. Sanchez
was refusing to speak without an attorney present to protect his secret.”
(Appellant’s brief., p. 23.) This argument makes no sense (the fact the police
were interviewing him was a good sign that invoking his right would not keep the
abuse secret) but, more importantly, is without basis in the record.

The

prosecutor did present a theme of secrets (Trial Tr., p. 138, Ls. 6-8; p. 263, Ls. 714; p. 266, L. 16 – p. 267, L. 1; p. 267, Ls. 15-18), but that theme was based on
evidence that Sanchez had threatened both girls in order for them to keep secret
the abuse (Trial Tr., p. 159, L. 25 – p. 160, L. 13; p. 174, Ls. 6-22; p. 178, Ls. 423; p. 195, Ls. 5-7). The prosecutor at no time and in no context mentioned the
evidence of the invocation of Miranda rights. (See generally Trial Tr.) Sanchez’s
claim that the prosecutor presented a “theme that Mr. Sanchez was refusing to
speak without an attorney present to protect his secret” is belied by the record.
Sanchez next argues that the state’s evidence is not “overwhelming.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 24.)

Even if true, such hardly meets his burden of

demonstrating that the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
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The evidence in question was provided in direct and full response to a
question by defense counsel, which makes the claim of a due process violation
at best dubious. Moreover, the lack of some objection by trial counsel has not
been shown to be less than tactical. Finally, Sanchez’s prejudice arguments
ignore the context of the trial proceedings. Sanchez has failed to show any, much
less all, of the three prongs of his fundamental error claim.
III.
Sanchez Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error Because The Cumulative Error
Doctrine Is Not Even Theoretically Applicable To This Case
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition,
cumulative error analysis does not include errors not objected to unless those
errors are found to be fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982.
Because Sanchez has asserted only one preserved claim of error, and can
prevail on his fundamental error claim only if it is deemed reversible error, he has
failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine has even theoretical application
to this case.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 11th day of October, 2016.
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